Dafalla Surur enlisted in the 3rd battalion King’s African Rifles on 1 October 1910 at the age of 27. His attestation papers state that he was of the Fadmlulu tribe, who’s chief was Lukudu, situated in Godokono village/district (Kenya). Dafalla was described as being in physically good condition, being 5 foot 11 with a 37-inch chest, and having tribal marks on his chest, back and forearm. His next of kin was his son, Suliman Dafalla who was living in Bombo, Uganda.

Interestingly, prior to enlisting we know that Dafalla was a gardener because of a rare medical document in his papers stating his trade/occupation.

Before the First World War started, Dafalla would have most likely been training or undertaking internal policing operations, as the King’s African Rifles were primarily a policing regiment designed for internal security (Moyse-Bartlett, 2014, p.259). Between January and February 1911, he went to hospital for having an abscess on his left heal, where he stayed for 11 days. We know he moved stations from Nairobi to Lake Rudolf (Lake Turkana, North Kenya) in late 1913, although no more information is provided beyond that. Despite achieving high marks on the annual musketry courses, Dafalla’s military offences sheet would strongly suggest he did not enjoy the discipline of his new life in the military.

Between 1910 to 1914, Dafalla committed 16 recorded military offences. Most of these offences included: not complying with orders, creating disturbances in the lines, arguing with NCOs, and being absent from a parade. There are also some interesting offences recorded such as, damaging a water tank on the 10 September 1912, and abusing an NCO on the 12 December 1913. On the same day, he then threatened to resist an escort to take him to the guardroom, receiving 10 lashes as punishment. Furthermore, when Dafalla went on leave on 4 March 1913 for 15 days, he exceeded it by 4 days. There could have been a variety of reasons for this, however, it is not hard to imagine Dafalla wanting to spend more time with his son. This might have been the last time he ever saw his son, given there were no more leave notices on his papers.

Around mid-1915, German efforts in the region consisted of blowing up sections of the Uganda railway which ran across the Voi area to Lake Victoria. During this period the Germans had occupied Longido West and showed signs of activity, therefore two companies of the 3rd KAR were sent to Bissil to strengthen the garrison.

On the 16th September, a force consisting of two companies of the 3rd KAR, the East African Mounted Rifles (E.A.M.R.), a squadron of the 17th Cavalry and 3rd KAR Mounted Infantry left their garrison to attack the Germans at Longido. In total, this mixed force was around 450 strong (Hordern, 1941, p.160).

Led by Lieutenant-Colonel Jollie (28th Cavalry), the force stopped at Oldoinyo Erok for two nights whilst the E.A.M.R. went ahead and reconnoitred the German camp, although little information was gathered. The German camp sat at the foot of a ridge running north and south down the southern end of the mountain, with an estimated force of no more than 80.

Orders were given on the 19th that the enemy would be surprised at dawn, and a plan was devised. KAR company “A” would ascend the mountain and surprise the Germans from above with a bayonet charge whilst “B” company attacked uphill from below the German camp (Moyse-Bartlett, 2014, p.293). “B” company was to wait for “A” company’s ambush at dawn before attacking, however, if for whatever reason “A” had not launched their attack then “B” was to carry out the attack alone. Dafalla could have been in either company during the attack.

The E.A.M.R. and the KAR mounted infantry were to take up positions on the ridge to the north and provide supporting fire when appropriate. Finally, the 17th Cavalry were to hide in a convenient position in the plains and wait for a convenient opportunity to ambush retreating German forces.

Unfortunately, the British attack on Longido West did not go according to plan. For a start, “A” company spent the night marching and climbing through dense forest on the upper slopes, tiring themselves out as they could not get in position in time for dawn. “B” company therefore launched its attack first on a misty morning on the 20th. However, it found itself confronted by a ‘labyrinth of thorn “bomas”’ that had been constructed during the British occupation of the camp several months prior in January. To make matters worse, once “A” coy launched its attack from above, it swung righthanded into “B” company’s position instead of reaching the enemy.

At this point, “B” company were already under heavy enemy fire, and the friendly fire which came down on them from the direction of the E.A.M.R. and KAR MI further hindered their advance through the thorn bomas. The parties continued to advance towards their objectives; however, casualties were beginning to mount up due to the heavy concentrated fire coming from the ridge. Communication between the companies once they had separated for the attack was virtually non-existent, making it difficult for the soldiers to adapt to the situation. German forcers also had a reason to fight particularly hard, as the 17th Cavalry had abandoned their hidden position, thereby warning the Germans of their fate should they retreat. After an hour of fighting, the order was given to retreat; the German defence had been formidable, and the soldiers were thirsty, tired, and took numerous casualties. The 3rd KAR lost 41 men killed and wounded, including Dafalla Surur.

The war diary records the march back to Bissil being particularly arduous:

“A return journey had to be made to the nearest water, which was a considerable hardship on the men who marched eighteen miles the previous night, fought for over six hours and had to carry their wounded back another eighteen miles, all on one bottle of water.” It also notes that this would be the last time that the 3rd KAR carried unfurled flags into action.

It was reported that German forces at Longido West had evacuated the camp on the next day, however, no attempt was made to re-occupy the camp (Hordern, 1941, p.161). Although we don’t know where Dafalla was buried, his attestation papers have given us a little glimpse into his personality, interests, and life in the military.

Sources

1) British Library, KAR/1910/1/88/2769.

2) British Library, WOMAT, Early Operations, British and German East Africa, 1914-1915, Wikimedia Commons. 

3) Charles Hordern, History of the Great War: Military Operations East Africa, Vol. 1 August 1914 - September 1916, (London: HMSO, 1941).

4) Hubert Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles: A Study in the Military History of East and Central Africa, 1890-1945, (East Sussex: Naval & Military Press, 2014).

5) WO 106/273, Record of the 3rd Battalion during the campaign in East Africa, 1914-18.